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Whose Agenda? Bottom up Positionalities of West African 
Migrants in the Framework of European Union Migration 
Management  
 Lothar Smith and Joris Schapendonk  
 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the position of West African mobility in light of the 
migration and development debate, and particularly the stance of the European 
Union (EU) on migration as being caused by failed local development. We hereby 
follow critical scholars who have highlighted that African migration is still seen 
as a ‘development problem’. From this starting point, we point to incoherent 
dimensions of EU migration-development policy-making. Subsequently, we use 
Sheppard’s notion of positionality to embed the discussion on West African 
mobility within a wider debate on West African livelihoods as bottom-up 
processes of globalisation. In so doing, we unbound the question of development 
beyond the territorial boundaries of a locality. However, these processes lead to 
new frictions. To further illustrate this, we dive into two empirical cases from 
Ghana and the Republic of Gambia that enable us to better understand how 
different positionalities lead to different kinds of values and interpretations 
regarding the development question. Our suggestion in the conclusion is to 
maintain such a pluralistic viewpoint on the migration-development relations 
and to follow more closely the frictions and synergies in these relations. 
Keywords Africa, mobility, trajectories, transnationalism, migrants, 
development, nexus.  
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SNAPSHOT 1:  
In January 2016, I, Joris Schapendonk, visited Pastor Bob, a Ghanaian leader of a 
Pentecostal church in Amsterdam. During our small talk over tea, he gives me a 
flyer concerning a new initiative, with the sub-header: “For a sustainable, better 
future, back home.” The initiative provides a one to three month training 
programme for undocumented migrants, which helps to prepare them for a 
‘sustainable return’ to their countries of origin. The flyer guarantees “protection 
against detention” and includes a powerfully written text on hope, fear related 
to a life as an undocumented migrant, and new horizons. The little European 
Union (EU) flag at the very end of the flyer gives a hint as to where the money for 
this initiative has come from: The EU Return Fund, with an annual budget of 
€645 million. A call, a week later, to the NGO indicated on the flyer reveals that 
the basis for the programme has since shifted. Now, as the friendly lady on the 
other end of the line patiently explained, the Dutch repatriation service, the 
Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek (DT&V), is the principal funder. This makes the 
church of Pastor Bob somehow liaised to the restrictive migration policy of the 
Dutch government.   
SNAPSHOT 2:  
During a visit to the northern part of Ghana in late-October 2017, a mutually 
befriended local academic brought Lothar Smith in touch with a local NGO, 
which had the terms ‘development’ and ‘migration’ in its name. Thereby, the 
request from both the academic and this NGO was to look critically at a draft 
proposal that sought to gain funding for the development of a so-called ‘village 
of hope’. In this project, returnee migrants (originating from northern Ghana) 
would have the chance to slowly integrate into local society again and, thereby, 
also re-invigorate local livelihoods. In addition, the proposal sought to minimise 
the influx of irregular migrants to Europe, and other cities in Ghana, through 
various different kinds of sensitising programmes that would discourage young 
people from leaving the region. For both sub-programmes, the underlying 
rationale was to make young adults aware of the scope for a local livelihood 
versus the dangers of migration. The proposal built on work conducted over the 
last 10 years to dissuade local youngsters from engaging in dangerous forms of 
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migration, through radio talk shows, drama and video documentaries. Funding 
for this initiative was sought from the German Federal Government. 
Introduction 
What defines the parameters of policies oriented towards migration, in 
conjunction with development? The prior two snapshots were taken from 
ethnographic fieldwork conducted over the last 10 years in Europe and various 
West African countries, such as Senegal, the Gambia and Ghana (more details 
to follow). They help to capture the complexity of the relation between, on the 
one hand, human mobility as it arises out of livelihood strategies of households 
and communities1 and, on the other hand, explicated concerns of states with 
these movements, both in Africa and Europe. A general distinction is often 
made between key policy concerns of migrants’ countries of origin and 
recipient countries. The increasing importance of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements between African and European states to ‘manage’ migration 
problematises this distinction to a large degree.  
It is important to note that many of these migration agreements stem from the 
EU’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This policy approach 
is characterised by an “external dimension” of migration management that 
includes both securitisation measures to curb unauthorised migration from 
Africa, as well as development initiatives that address the so-called root causes 
of migration in order to prevent outward migration. The Emergency Trust 
Fund, being one of the major outcomes of the Valetta Summit that brought 
together African and European leaders in November 2015, is one of the latest 
developments in this respect. Through such agreements, the EU gains further 
foothold in the West African region in its quest to stem unwanted migration 
(Trauner & Deimel, 2013; Andersson, 2014). There are two major 
consequences of the GAMM. First, the EU border shifts further southwards 
with, for instance, EU border control missions close to the Senegalese coastline 
in 2006-2007 and, more recently, in mobility hubs of the Sahel, with Agadez as 
the most notable place for border interventions (Molenaar et al., 2017). 
A second major consequence is that the substantial funds available – 
development funds in particular – open up the field of migration management 
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to a whole range of actors in Europe and Africa that are all eager to play a role, 
not least because of the money that can be earned from their involvement. 
Thereby, migration has become an economic niche that finds itself increasingly 
commercialised and professionalised through the establishment of an ever-
expanding migration industry (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg-Sorensen, 2013; 
Cranston et al., 2018). The overall trend is an increasing diversity of actors 
operating in the tripartite relationship between migration, development and 
securitisation (Nyberg-Sorensen, 2012). At times, this has led to unlikely 
pairings between actors, as in the case of the first snapshot above, in which a 
Pentecostal church became an actor in a deportation continuum emanating 
from subcontracted alliances between state apparatuses and civil society 
actors in the Netherlands (Kalir & Wissink, 2016). Furthermore, with regard 
to the second snapshot, Andersson (2014:52) carefully unpacks the 
development aid induced “food chain” to show how, in hierarchical order, 
international institutions, Western NGOs and local initiatives all share the 
same objective of addressing the root causes of migration. Critical scholars, 
however, have pointed to the sedentarist logics behind these preventive 
migration measures, as these initiatives mainly emerge in order to ‘keep 
people in their place’ (Bakewell, 2008; Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017).  
In this paper, we contrast the logic of the EU’s migration-development policy 
agenda, with the bottom-up development dynamics that derive from processes 
of migration. In so doing, we unpack the manner in which migration is 
contextualised in transnational networks, giving impetus to the role particular 
places can play, yet also acknowledging the contingency on government policy 
frameworks like GAMM. This raises issues of ‘positionality’ (Sheppard, 2002), 
which may result in friction during the enactment of translocal developments 
by migrants and their counterparts (Grillo & Riccio, 2004; Zoomers & van 
Westen, 2011).  
To help explain these processes, we will refer to two empirical cases that 
highlight the various ways West Africans position themselves in a globalising 
world in which mobility opportunities become increasingly polarised 
(Bauman, 1998). The first case resulted from fieldwork conducted during the 
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2002-2015 period, initially through the multi-sited Ghana TransNet 
programme (Mazzucato, 2000; Grillo & Mazzucato, 2008), which studied the 
economic influence of transnational networks linking Ghanaian migrants in 
the Netherlands with their counterparts in the rural Ashanti Region of Ghana 
(Kabki, 2007) and Accra (Smith, 2007) on local economies. In subsequent 
years, annual visits to Ghana allowed for further explorations of this data. The 
second case is based on a four-year (2014-2018) research project that aims to 
follow the dynamic and fragmented mobility trajectories of West African 
migrants to and within the EU. For this project, fieldwork is conducted in 
several European countries as well is in the Gambia.  
The two cases enable us to better understand new opportunities and 
dependencies emerging in transnational spaces, and what role migration may 
play therein. Based on this discussion, we conclude by emphasising the need 
for pluralistic viewpoints on migration-development relations, specifically in 
policy development, to better adhere to the reality of the role of migration in 
developmental processes. First, however, we frame migration-development as 
an inconsistent policy field in the framework of the EU’s migration 
management approach. Subsequently, we briefly sketch a variety of West 
African positionalities in times of globalisation to embed discussions on 
migration within a wider globe-spanning field of power relations.      
The Complex Logics of The EU’s Migration-Development Approach 
The GAMM is the EU’s comprehensive policy approach that serves as an 
overarching framework of EU policy regarding migration and asylum. 
Although this policy framework is seen as a direct response to the Arab Spring 
in 2011, its existence has a long history that can at least be traced back to the 
Vienna Action Plan in 1998. This action plan launched a concentric circle 
approach to migration management, consisting of three circles. The inner 
circle presents the EU Schengen zone, the second circle is the European 
neighbourhood and the third circle consists of ‘migrant sending countries’, 
located primarily in the Global South. As a major follow up, and particularly 
after the border events by which migrants climbed the fences of Ceuta and 
Melilla, the European Commission launched the Global Approach to Migration 
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(GAM) in 2005 (Eisele, 2012). GAM further articulated the EU’s objective of 
managing migration flows by means of ‘genuine partnerships’ with third 
countries. In 2011, GAM evolved into GAMM, an expanded policy framework 
that addresses both questions of migration and mobility. GAMM is founded on 
the following four pillars: 
1) Better organisation of legal migration and fostering well-managed 
mobility; 
2) Preventing and combating irregular migration; 
3) Maximising the development impact of migration; and 
4) Promoting international protection and enhancing the external 
dimension of asylum. 
Development, as a policy ideology, is prominently present in two of these four 
pillars. While development is articulated as a tool to prevent irregular 
migration in pillar 2, it is simultaneously framed as a positive effect of 
migration in pillar 3. For pillar 2, it is important to note that irregular migration 
is directly and indirectly framed as the undesired outcome of persistent 
poverty and underdevelopment. Subsequently, the argument can be made that 
there are no longer legitimate reasons for people to migrate when poverty has 
disappeared. Such reasoning is not only empirically problematic, as is made 
clear with the so-called ‘migration hump’ theory (de Haas, 2010),2 but it also 
shows that development as a policy field becomes aligned to all manner of 
harsh border controls and strict asylum regulations. As a result, the nexus of 
security-migration and the nexus of migration-development merge in reality 
(Nyberg-Sorenson, 2012).  
Pillar 3 subsumes a rather different set of policies, namely those focusing on 
the role of migrant remittances to help (co-)development in regions of origin. 
It is repeatedly stressed that these remittances outnumber official 
development cooperation and, over the last decade, migrants have thus also 
been warmly welcomed as important development agents, partnering the 
state and the more ‘traditional’ cooperation NGOs in the field of development 
cooperation (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).  
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Fascinatingly, these two pillars derive from an opposing logic regarding the 
relationship between migration and development. Pillar 2 starts from the 
notion that development policies must aim to improve the socio-economic 
situations in the sending regions, to help people stay in places of origin (more 
development = less migration). Pillar 3 implicates a policy vision that 
migration has a positive impact on development processes (more migration = 
more development) (Schapendonk, 2013). It is important to see how these 
policy logics are difficult to reconcile, making the policy field of migration-
development extremely complex (Eisele, 2012; Trauner & Deimel, 2013).  
According to the European Commission, the four pillars of GAMM are of equal 
importance. While on paper this is true, as there are no sub-divisions made in 
the presentation of the four pillars, we may question whether this reflects the 
reality on the ground. To illustrate this, we can unpack the financial structure 
of the EU’s Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. At the time of writing (June 2018), 
the Emergency Trust Fund totalled EUR 3.39 billion, of which the largest share 
– EUR 2.98 billion – comes from the European Development Fund (EDF) 
(European Commission, n.d.a). With this money, the Trust Fund aims to 
achieve conventional development goals, such as the creation of greater 
economic opportunities, strengthening the rule of law and making 
communities more resilient. When we look at the actual projects being 
implemented under the header of ‘Inclusive Economic Development’, it is 
interesting to note that development questions are strongly linked with 
restrictive asylum and migration policy that includes deportations (European 
Commission, n.d.b). For instance, the Youth Empowerment Scheme in the 
Gambia, being funded with EUR 11 million, aims to reduce “migration pressure 
by improving the skills and employability of potential and/or returning 
migrants.” There have already been reports on protests of returnees in front of 
the IOM office in the Gambia, who feel that the IOM promises of development 
back home have not been fulfilled. 
Next to ‘inclusive development programmes,’ the Trust Fund is also put in 
place to “improve migration management in countries of origin, transit and 
destination.” It follows that development money is used to develop 
“sustainable policies in the areas of security, justice, migration and border 
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management.” For the West African region, this has led to the training of 
national security forces and border guards in Burkina Faso and Niger, and the 
reinforcement of a data transmission system on security issues (European 
Commission, n.d.a). 
In the context of the latter, Niger, and in particular the city of Agadez, is seen 
as a main point of EU intervention in their combat to fight irregular migration. 
While, trans-Saharan mobility from this particular place to Libya has been an 
age-old phenomenon, it has become increasingly criminalised in recent years 
(Brachet, 2018). In line with this, the European Trust Fund has started 
financing anti-smuggling campaigns in this West African mobility hub, which 
indeed lowered the number of travellers passing through Agadez. Recent 
reports based on community surveys in Agadez, however, show that about 
70% of the respondents see EU-induced anti-smuggling measures as harmful 
to the Agadez community. Moreover, adverse economic impacts have been 
noted, which go beyond the actors that transport migrants across the Sahara. 
Bus companies, money transfer agencies, taxi drivers and vendors of food and 
water, among others, have all experienced negative consequences of these EU 
interventions in their daily lifeworlds (Molenaar et. al., 2017). Thus, the 
European Development Money is not only spent on practices that curb 
unwanted migration, but may also have devastating effects on ‘development’ 
processes on the ground. 
West African Positionalities in a Globalising World  
Migration cannot be addressed in isolation from other flows that mark the 
impact of globalisation on the world, at various scales. For this reason, we need 
to put bottom-up processes of West African migration within a broader 
framework that is sensitive to the position of West Africans in processes of 
globalisation. Linking up with processes of globalisation can be both a blessing 
and a curse, and in many cases it may be both. This is, for instance, reflected in 
the re-fashioned notion of the so-called ‘resource curse’ (Collins, 2016), 
whereby the global political-economy continues to push countless Africans 
into the margins of the economy and lessens their prospects for development. 
How many? They are quite literally countless, as many African states still have 
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weak databases for aggregating measures of income and growth, partly 
because of lively informal economies (Jerven, 2013). Yet, we can say more 
about the processes they are subjected to, such as the impact of exploitative 
mineral industries (e.g. Behrens et al., 2007), large-scale land grabbing (e.g. 
Zoomers, 2010), systems of corruption (e.g. David-Barrett & Okamura, 2016) 
and an overall persistence of neo-colonial relations (e.g. Dekker, 2017). Such 
messages create a somewhat dystopian picture of Africa as the ‘lost continent’. 
Other perspectives, notably those focusing on Africa’s position in global 
economic developments through analyses of macro-economic data, suggest a 
somewhat brighter perspective. Thus, one message, picked up by media 
around the world, argues that “six of the world’s ten fastest growing economies 
of the past decade are [located] in sub-Saharan Africa” (The Economist, 2013, 
data taken from the World Bank). Our position is that both extreme viewpoints 
should be avoided, especially when these follow deterministic conceptions of 
development. Instead, we argue that it is much more relevant to better grasp 
how people in various parts of West Africa, both urban and rural, are able to 
navigate the uncertain, partially-globalised economic world of which they have 
become a part (Vigh, 2006).  
To further understand this, we use Sheppard’s (2002) notion of positionality 
as being a position in a relational time/space within a global political economy 
that both shapes and is shaped by processes of globalisation. Positionality, in 
other words, reflects the “transnational topology of power” (Ferguson, 2006: 
89). This also helps to move us well beyond redundant analyses of Africa as a 
homogeneous continent. Rather, we speak of multiple positionalities in a 
framework of globalisation. We thereby particularly stress how powerful 
global systems – like the EU’s migration management apparatus – produce 
margins that still leave room for manoeuvrability (Simone & Pieterse, 2018). 
We provide three examples of such positionality here that directly or indirectly 
relate to processes of mobility and migration.  
One example of such positionality comes from ‘forex’ bureaus, which are 
omnipresent in West African cities. Whilst on the surface they provide a simple 
service – allowing their customers to exchange local with foreign currencies or 
vice versa, taking a small profit from the exchange – their role is key. They 
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enable their customers – be these traders, travellers, local businessmen or 
everyday citizens with paid jobs – to not only engage in commercial activity 
with business partners elsewhere, but also to deal with currency fluctuations, 
thereby smoothing their income flows. This remains of vital importance, 
particularly in the informal economy (Osei, 1996: 28; author’s (Smith) own 
field observations, 2004-2016).  
Another example of such positionality comes from Bolay’s (2017) work on 
artisanal gold diggers in the West African region. Within a highly exploitative 
supply chain, the artisanal gold diggers create spaces of “social inversion” and 
an “ethics of luck” through their informal practices and mobility tactics: 
The ethic of luck at play in everyday work may also contribute to the 
attractiveness of mining spaces for the alternative hierarchies, 
identifications and sources of social value it facilitates […] Of course this 
view falls within the set of representations that structure gold mining 
micropolitics and do not mitigate the conflicts and exploitation that 
takes place in the sector, although it may bolster the appeal of mining 
spaces beyond purely economic explanations (Bolay, 2017: 137). 
While these gold miners seek to find ways to invert a highly exploitative 
system in their own favour, many others initiate bottom-up processes of 
globalisation. Indeed, in these contexts, linking up has become the pathway 
towards social-economic progress. This is illustrated by the third example 
coming from Ceesay’s (2016) compelling ethnography of two types of 
‘hustlers’ in the Gambia. 
The first group of people are the ‘beach boys’ who are looking for ‘a connection’ 
with tourists from the Global North in Gambian tourist spaces. The second 
group are online hustlers, locally known as chanters, who establish online 
relationships and have different ‘itineraries of accumulation’ through their 
‘love methods’ (Ceesay, 2016: 49). While the first actors in Ceesay’s study have 
a defined geographical space to look for global connectivity – a space locally 
known as the ‘industry side’, i.e the coastal zone, where tourism is visibly 
present – the second group of hustlers find their ways through virtual space. 
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Interestingly, Ceesay positions his study in an environment of involuntary 
immobility (Carling, 2002), as many of his informants express the aspiration 
to move out of the Gambia (also see Smith, 2015; Prothmann, 2017). While 
European policy makers see this outward mobility mostly as a problem from a 
border management perspective and seek to understand this mobility as a 
‘failure of development’, these would-be movers perceive mobility as the 
shortest route to improve their lives and those of their families. Cross-border 
mobility can then be best understood as a process of ‘globalisation from below’ 
(Mohan & Zack-Williams, 2002), as it opens up an entire new field of 
connectivities. However, as we will indicate below, these connectivities may 
also lead to new frictions.  
Translocal Development and Friction 
Since linking up seems to be an important strategy for West Africans in light of 
processes of globalisation, we suggest applying a translocal development lens, 
as is introduced by Zoomers and van Westen (2011). Building on relational 
geography and a Sennian development approach, the translocal development 
perspective unbounds the notion of local development by paying better 
attention to the connections and mobilities that transcend the local levels. In 
other words, this translocal perspective is particularly helpful in unpacking the 
geographical complexities of migration and development (Benz, 2014). 
The concept of translocal development, however, does not only account for 
specific synergies that catalyse development impacts. It also explicitly refers 
to specific frictions within the same processes. Friction, as a concept, may refer 
to the processes or factors that hamper and oppose mobilities (such as border 
controls, distance and surveillance), as well as the encounters in our mobile 
world that may have profound effects in creating new societal directions. In 
both instances, the work of Tsing (2011:19) is of vital importance, as she 
introduces the concept of friction as follows: “As a metaphorical image, friction 
reminds us that heterogeneous and unequal encounters can lead to new 
arrangements of culture and power.” Friction, therefore, does not only emerge 
due to tensions between sedentary policy initiatives that aim to keep people in 
their place (Bakewell, 2008), on the one hand, and cultures of mobility in West 
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Africa, on the other. It may also appear within bottom-up development 
practices that create specific moralities and expectations, particularly 
concerning the relationship between migrants and their communities back 
home (Raghuram, 2009).  
Before we present our empirical cases, it is worthwhile to put in perspective 
the value of connectivity in understanding how translocal developments may 
come about. Thereby, we focus particularly on remittances as a phenomenon 
that has often been seen as an important tool for development. With the 
volume of migration of Africans to destinations within (Bakewell & Jonsson, 
2011) and outside the continent (de Haas, 2007) increasing, one might also 
expect a concomitant increase in the volume of remittances sent. While in 
absolute terms, increases in remittance volume have indeed been recorded, 
African migrants send home far lower amounts of remittances, at least through 
official channels, than their compatriots from Asian and Latin American 
countries of origin. According to the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances 
Fact Book (2016), there is only one sub-Saharan African country – Nigeria – 
that makes it to the top-30 of remittance receiving countries. When more 
relative numbers are taken into account, such as the share of remittances as a 
percentage of the GDP, then two West African countries appear in the top-ten 
remittance-receiving countries. These are: Liberia and the Gambia. While this 
observation certainly points to the importance of migrant money for these 
particular national economies, these numbers do need to be put into 
perspective to avoid feeding a particular discourse that sees remittances as the 
new panacea of development. For one, not a single country receives 
remittances without also being a remittance sending country at the same time. 
For instance, whilst remittances do make up 24% of Liberia’s  total GDP and 
are crucial to the functioning of the country’s economy (World Bank, 2016), 
what is too often ignored is that Liberia is also an important remittance-
sending country. According to the same World Bank records, the outflowing 
remittances from Liberia are approximately 18% of the same GDP. Second, it 
is worthwhile to remember that just France and Germany, with a total 
population of roughly 150 million, already receive more remittances than the 
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entire sub-Saharan Africa region, which houses a total population of 970 
million people (World Bank, 2016).  
The divide in these numbers makes clear that Africa’s international migrants 
who make it to some part of the Global North are in a less favourable position 
than migrants coming from other parts of the world and/or may have little 
urge to invest in their countries of origin. These insights, however, should not 
be taken to suggest that the journeys of African migrants to other regions of 
the world are without value. Rather, it helps to understand how, despite the 
precarious nature of many of their journeys and the scale of investment 
required to reach the Global North, they are still able to remit home.  
A final critique on remittances as a resource for development cooperation 
concerns the still-prevalent idea that remittances are non-contextual flows of 
monetary funds that can be simply be tapped into, or ‘harnessed’, by 
governments of countries to fit their development agenda. This ignores the 
core reason for the very existence of these remittances: they resulted from the 
decision of individuals, alone or with their families, to engage in migration as 
the best way to secure savings with which to then achieve specific goals. Hence, 
while migrants often also exhibit a certain commitment towards their home 
countries, their migration, as an economic project, is primarily intended to 
benefit themselves and their immediate social circle (Schapendonk & Smith, 
2008). The ways in which these remittances are fraught with complexities will 
become clear in the following two cases, with particular focus on how 
remittances are contextualised in social relations across transnational space 
and how their meaning is further defined and refined by local actors and the 
locations they become immersed in. The first case dives into the social 
dimension of remittances in Ghana and approaches the transfer of money as 
part of intertwining personal agendas. The social dimension re-positions the 
development-induced morality regarding investments in migrant houses, 
which is mostly seen from a policy perspective as a mere consumptive form of 
remittances. The second case dives into the ways mobility trajectories of 
individuals are inherently related to each other and how this creates different 
dependencies along paths of movement. These two cases are used to reveal 
essential linkages between human mobility and developmental incentives in 
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transnational contexts, which may help to redress the current emphasis in 
policy development on non-mobility solutions through ‘development at home’ 
programmes. 
Case 1: the Morality of Migrant Investments in ‘Mansions’  
Migrants across the world invest in houses in their countries of origin. Such 
investments form a considerable part of the total flow of remittances sent 
home by migrants (Massey et al., 1998; Henry & Mohan, 2003; Seitinger, 2003). 
This is not without reason, as the desire to own a house remains one of the 
primary reasons for migrants, notably those who are lesser-skilled, to migrate 
in the first place. Yet, this inclination of migrants to invest in houses is often 
considered problematic by policy makers, as well as some academics. Sinatti 
(2015) explains this issue using the case of Senegal. Her research shows how 
governments of countries of origin seek to lure their foreign-based nationals 
into investing back home. Thereby, the frustration lies with the ability to 
redirect the remittances they send away from ‘satisfying consumptive needs’, 
towards supporting all manner of ‘real’ economic goals. Sinatti (2015:91) 
notes that “[m]igrants are described [in government circles] as ‘simply 
hoarding savings or [..] putting their money into anarchical socio-economic 
constructions’ (Diatta and Mbow 1999:253).” Osili (2004) contests this 
government perspective in an analysis of the propensity of Nigerian migrants 
based in the United States to invest in houses, concluding:  
Housing investments may be the first stage of a broader investment 
relationship between migrants and their countries of origin. Institutional 
knowledge gained through housing investments in their community of 
origin may be applied toward a wide set of investment objectives, 
particularly where home family and home town association networks 
mitigate some of the risks associated with investing in the home 
community (Osili, 2004: 844). 
In the context of Accra, Ghana’s capital city and the site of repeated fieldwork 
conducted by Smith in the period 2002-2015 (Smith, 2007), these points help 
us to reconsider the traction of the debate on the desirability of such 
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transnational investments, as related to their ‘productiveness’ in a local 
economy in the long run (Black et al., 2003). Smith and Mazzucato (2009) 
argue that the legitimacy of this concern primarily rests on the level at which 
this impact is considered. Thus, a macro-level analysis may conclude that the 
same capital could have been invested more profitably in a range of other 
economic activities, whether rural- or urban-based. Yet, this analysis would 
not take into consideration the effects of these remittances at a micro level, and 
would fail to provide answers to questions directly related to these 
investments, such as: Why? How? And why there? These are crucial questions 
as they help to unravel and explain the rationale behind migrant investments, 
the transnational arrangements through which these are achieved – given the 
physical distance between the migrant and his/her investment – and what is 
in it for all parties involved.  
Clearly, investments in houses implies making investments in transnational 
relationships, which are complex, multi-directional arrangements across vast 
physical space. To this end, an analysis focusing on the actors involved can help 
explain the exact value of investments from a personal perspective. In other 
words, remittances need to be understood as the result of intertwining 
personal agendas. These agendas can result in a multi-directional flow of 
money, goods, ideas and persons across the globe, whereby each remittance 
transaction has a defined purpose. Insight into the development of 
transnational engagements, often over extended periods of time, between 
actors at two different ends of the world, helps unravel the role of particular 
institutional norms and rules, as well as the trust that is produced and 
reproduced in relations. Additionally, the location and moment in time (which 
is also related to the life-stage of those involved) of investments, as well as the 
the room for manoeuvre available to actors to give their own meaning to the 
purpose of remittances is underscored.  
Remittances are nearly always contextualised, personified outcomes of 
choices that migrants, and those with whom they engage, make to help achieve 
projects of an individual or communal nature (Åkesson & Baaz, 2015: 72). The 
link between development and notions of inclusion, is understood only by 
studying the personal transnational spaces and lifeworlds in which these 
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remittances are embedded. Macro analysis of remittance flows cannot see this, 
simply because of its focus on aggregate numbers. It is true that, for 
remittances, these numbers are impressive, so it is not hard to understand the 
lure of them. However, such aggregate numbers are irrelevant. For instance, a 
large city in the Global North, looking for ways to find funds with which to 
finance a major overhaul of its public transport system, might be keenly eyeing 
the total amount of savings held in accounts in local banks, but obviously these 
are not theirs to use. For remittances this also holds true.  
All in all, Case 1 illustrates the morals attached to remittances by policy 
makers: they perceive remittances as a potential channel for addressing 
developmental issues (DfID, 2005; Orozco, 2006) and will continue to eye 
migrant investments in houses with distaste, as wasted consumptive 
investments.3 Thus, they will ignore how these investments can actually help 
create a conducive environment for the same migrants to also invest in other 
sectors of the local and national economy.  
Case 2: Timing ‘Development’ - Multiple Dependencies Along the Migrant 
Pathway  
The second case is part of a research project that follows the so-called 
trajectory approach in migration studies (Schapendonk et. al., 2018). This 
methodological design is meant to follow individuals along their pathways of 
movement on the basis of longitudinal ethnographic engagements. This 
connection with informants over time allows the ethnographer to use the same 
methods (interviewing, observations and informal conversations) in the 
different places the mobile informants pass through. In the framework of this 
itinerant methodology (Bolay, 2017; Schapendonk, 2017; 2018), I, Joris 
Schapendonk, had the chance to visit the places of origin of some of my 
Gambian informants whose mobility trajectories I had followed for some years 
in Europe.  
Although I had heard many stories about the Gambia from my informants, a 
field visit to their places of origin enabled me to better understand the 
relationship between ‘home’ and ‘away’, as well as the relationships between 
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my informants and their relatives and friends ‘at home’. The case presented 
here is also situated in the translocal space connecting Europe to Serekunda 
and to a village in the North Bank region of the Gambia. It binds together the 
stories of two Gambian brothers, Dawda and Yahya, and the story of Dawda’s 
best friend Alagie (for the purpose of this research, pseudonyms are used). 
Following the migration of the two brothers, Alagie had taken up the role of 
broker to deal with family issues on behalf of the two brothers, and engaged 
with them in business-related matters. Interestingly, as Smith (2007) also 
earlier found in the Ghanaian context, migrants often do not rely on family 
members for streamlining their investments and remittances in this 
transnational space. The role of broker, however, also gave Alagie the 
opportunity to move to Europe on a tourist visa, as we will learn later. 
In terms of their migration profile, the three men differ considerably. The 
oldest brother – Dawda – moved to Europe ten years ago and for a time was 
working as a security guard in the tourism sector. During this period, he 
started a relationship with a Dutch lady. This relationship granted him formal 
access to the Netherlands. In this particular country, he now has a stable job, a 
house and a rather rich social life. After he broke up with the Dutch lady (also 
the mother of his oldest child), he married a Gambian woman. She came from 
the same village of origin and recently joined Dawda in the Netherlands. They 
now have one daughter together. His ability to attain a ‘stable life’ in the 
Netherlands has also impacted the village where he came from, as Dawda 
financed projects, such as the construction of a so-called “line-house”, 
consisting of six living spaces that house some of the villagers.  
Dawda’s younger brother, Yahya, took a rather different path. In 2013, Yahya 
embarked on his trip to Europe, taking the ‘backway’, the dangerous crossing 
through the Sahara, to reach Libya. On the way, while in Niger, he received 
money from Dawda, which enabled him to continue his journey. This situation 
is common for many migrants moving along this trans-Saharan route, as the 
costs and risks of travel often far exceed estimations made beforehand 
(Belloni, 2016). When Yahya finally reached Italy, he entered the asylum 
procedure. This resulted in a fragmented legal status: he obtained two short-
lived documents, in between which he underwent a period of undocumented-
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ness. Notwithstanding his precarious situation, he still felt an urge to start 
sending money home once he had spent a year abroad. However, his brother 
advised him not to do so. Dawda stated: 
He asked me, “should I send money home now?” I said, “Nooooo! Tell 
them you are searching for papers, tell them you are still suffering. Keep 
the money. Save it for the travel” (Conversation with Dawda in the 
Netherlands, September 2014).  
The third Gambian man, Alagie, only stayed in Europe for three months. Dawda 
had arranged an official invitation through the Embassy for him, which 
resulted in a three month valid tourist visa. This somewhat surprised Alagie as 
he had gone through the same process before, yet with a rejection as the result. 
From a Gambian perspective, the visa system of EU countries is little more than 
a lottery system (Piot, 2010; Gaibazzi, 2014). As a friend of Alagie put it:  
 The visa system is gambling. You can try thirty times without no luck, 
but you can also get it after one shot. But if you don’t get it, they don’t 
give you back your money. So they make business, it is a gambling 
business (Conversation with Amadou in the Gambia, September 2017). 
Alagie returned to the Gambia according to his visa conditions. There, he runs 
a gym and a shop, both financed by his good friend Dawda. Seeing the two 
businesses, I remembered how Dawda had, over the years, bought all kinds of 
second hand gym equipment and machines, filling various containers with 
these and other goods that he sold in the Gambia through his friend Alagie. 
Where both businesses had been flourishing before, Alagie noted how the 
supplies were drying up lately: 
 At this moment, I think Dawda has no money. He has his own family that 
he needs to take care of first […] And, of course, he spent so much money 
on the village, and he spent too much money on the backway projects of 
his brothers, so his money is dried up now (Conversation with Alagie in 
the Gambia, October 2017). 
Indeed, on various occasions, Dawda explained that he had felt the need to 
financially help some of his young relatives who had decided to try their luck 
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at migrating to Europe. Now, Alagie is feeling the negative consequences of 
this. In turn, his own social network is also feeling the repercussions of this, as 
he has found it increasingly hard to send the usual monthly amount of 1000 
Gambian Dalasi [around 17 Euros] to his mother in Senegal. Seeking a way to 
improve this situation, he is once again assessing his chances of reaching 
Europe. 
A synthesis: Notes on Migration and Development 
The two cases illustrate that we cannot fully understand the role of 
remittances in development processes without taking into account the 
positionality of the migrant. In this light, Raghuram (2009) rightly asks the 
question: what, and whose, development do we speak of when we discuss the 
relation of migration to development? Whilst the first case discussed a more 
general phenomenon that we see in many places across Africa – migrant 
investments in houses – the second case gave first-hand insight into the 
multiple interdependencies produced in the trans-world of migrants. These 
dynamics underscore that any attempt to ‘territorialise’ development impact 
provides a one-sided and limited picture of the widely discussed migration-
development relation (Zoomers & van Westen, 2011; Nijenhuis & Leung, 
2017). Moreover, a viewpoint stressing ‘local development impact’ would 
reproduce the notion that development always works in only one direction, 
from North to South. By contrast, both cases show that we could better frame 
‘development’ within a “force-field of relationalities” (Ingold, 2011:93), in 
which social-economic transformations linked to migration need to be 
understood as flowing in multiple directions simultaneously. Within this force-
field, each individual has a different positionality which, in turn, creates all 
kinds of values and interpretations of what is seen as good and bad, 
worthwhile and redundant.  
These manifold interpretations can create all kinds of frictions in the 
transnational worlds of migrants, producing new dependencies and burdens. 
Indeed, it is for this reason that many migrants seek ways to escape the moral 
questions of development back home. However, frictions can also be 
productive when they provide some kind of grip on global connectivity (Tsing, 
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2011). They may result in new societal directions, in affirmations of particular 
social institutions, and create incentives that may be much more sustainable 
because of the hard questions asked about their meaning and impact. This is 
in line with relational thinking in human geography (Massey, 2005) and 
anthropology (Ingold, 2011), as well as development literature that follows a 
Sennian approach. Furthermore, we also avoid a ‘fixing’ of development, an 
approach that reduces the question of development to specific, bounded 
geographical entities, be they singular places or regions. 
In this context of interdependency, we can attempt to understand the 
reasoning behind Dawda’s advice to his younger brother to invest further in 
his migration trajectory, rather than send remittances to his family back home. 
It is paramount for migrants to time investments in countries of origin 
correctly to mitigate the social pressure that may arise thereafter for them to 
send more money (Smith, 2007). Not only are many migrants not in the 
position to send back money on a regular basis, they may actually also still be 
receivers of support from their families, notably during the more difficult 
stages along their trajectories (Belloni, 2016). Yet, in the discussion of 
remittances, we focus mainly on the direction of financial flows from the 
developed to the developing world. In line with earlier arguments in this 
article about the macro numbers, we plea for a more critical look at remittance 
flows that takes into consideration how money flows involving migrants are 
embedded in translocal spaces. This also takes both the inflow and outflow of 
family money, as well as other kinds of investments (such as time and other 
resources) into account. Then, we are able to draw a more nuanced picture of 
remittances as the motor for development (Schapendonk & Smith, 2008). Most 
importantly, this perspective also helps us move away from the one-sided, but 
dominant, policy notion that development is there to reduce migration 
(Bakewell, 2008). In line with this, it is striking that the UNDP report of 2009 
(UNDP, 2009), which suggests the need to lower barriers to migration, has 
rapidly fallen out of grace. This could be a sign of political unwill, but also of 
continued misconceptions of how people construct their livelihoods and 
therein give significance to places. 
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Conclusion 
This paper began with a critical discussion of the EU’s approach to migration 
and development that is biased towards the notion that development may be 
used as an important tool to halt migration. We contrasted this policy ambition 
with the bottom-up processes of globalisation, by which West Africans seek 
ways to participate in processes of globalisation. We highlighted the multiple 
positionalities at stake in these processes. This pluralist starting point moves 
away from both optimistic and pessimistic viewpoints of the global future of 
sub-Saharan Africa. In our view, and here we follow de Haas (2010), the 
relation between transnational migration and development should be 
understood, assessed and positioned within the same pluralist perspective. 
This argument is more than simply admitting that we have reached the end of 
grand narratives in social science. It is, instead, a plea to follow social and 
economic impacts – i.e. the frictions and synergies – carefully. Only then can 
we see that remittances can be both productive and consumptive (as emerged 
from the Ghanaian case). We may also be more sensitive to the multiple 
directions of monetary transactions as well as the social conditions, 
interdependencies and power relations in which remittances are grounded (as 
illustrated by both cases). Moreover, this approach enables us to scrutinise the 
logics of development projects that are inherently related to the securitised 
migration control agenda of the Global North (as exemplified with the case of 
the Village of Hope in Ghana in the Introduction). Thereby, we are also better 
able to understand how some migrants, like Pastor Bob in Amsterdam, have 
become an integral part of the same restrictive migration policy agenda.  
Thus, we hereby claim that it is far more productive to analyse how different 
trajectories of migration and different development potentials intersect with 
and counteract each other, than to preconfigure an analytical approach along 
the lines of either the migration-development optimist or migration-
development pessimist camp (de Haas, 2010). As so many theorists have 
argued, globalisation in general, and transnational migration in particular, 
intensifies interdependencies in our world. This statement should then also 
inform our research methodologies and help to redirect the current sedentary 
orientation of migration and development policies towards intersectional, 
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actor-relevant directions. For it remains striking that the money of migrants is 
generally valued for its positive development impact by governments in both 
the Global North and Global South whilst the migrants themselves encounter 
more and more barriers, many imposed by these same governments. 
Ultimately, potential migrants, as potential bottom-up enablers of improved 
livelihood opportunities through transnational configurations, are even 
prevented from leaving their places of origin under the same ‘development’ 
banner. This may well spread further the general feeling of involuntary 
immobility (Carling, 2002) and even global abjection (Ferguson, 2006) among 
African youth. Many Africans recognise how affected they are by globalisation, 
but find themselves unable to capitalise on their own position in these flows, 
and thereby their say in them, through their own mobility. Irrespective of the 
success of policy measures to actually contain people, we seriously question 
whether in the long run these policy measures are truly effective and/or 
morally sustainable. Why is it that a survey in Agadez indicates that 70% of the 
local population sees negative effects of EU projects subsumed under a 
development fund? Why is it that nobody seems to talk anymore about 
lowering the barriers to movements, as suggested by the UNDP report of 2009? 
From our viewpoints, the answer lies in the fact that the development agendas 
of state apparatuses and the development agendas of people practicing 
bottom-up processes of globalisation are worlds apart. 
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Notes 
1 This is a relation entailed in the work of scholars of the New Economics of 
Labour Migration School, and in pluralist approaches to livelihood studies. See 
de Haas (2010) for an overview. 
2 In short, the migration hump theory suggests that a rising level of household 
income may actually induce rather than reduce migration. Indeed, it is only 
when a certain level of wealth is achieved that households become indifferent 
to opportunities elsewhere and migration rates may decline (de Haas, 2010). 
3 In the same vein, Bracking and Sachikonye (2006:5 in Bracking & Sachikonye, 
2010:206) explain how, particularly in politically volatile countries, such as 
Zimbabwe during the last decade, remittances can provide much of the money 
needed by urban households to pay for everyday consumables. 
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